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ARGUMENT 
Issue No. 1 
The Lower Court Improperly Considered Items 
Outside The Scope of The Final Decree 
In the Appellee's brief, he states that the Divorce Decree in 
this action is unique. This is true. The Appellee then goes on to 
state that the trial court was simply entering a final order 
concerning alimony as the first order was only a temporary order. 
This is false. The order, agreed to by the parties and entered by 
the court in the original divorce action, was a final order. The 
only portion of the order that was subject to review after one year 
was whether the alimony would continue or terminate. This is 
evidenced by the trial court's own language when the Judge stated 
that 
"the issue of continuing or terminating the alimony 
provision is before the court properly in this motion. 
But increasing requires a modification of the agreement 
of the parties that led to the stipulated divorce decree. 
And I think that brings into play on that particular 
issue rule 6-404 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, which requires the filing of a petition 
and service of a summons and the whole provision." (R. 
128-129). 
If the amount of alimony could not be changed pursuant to the 
motion before the court, then it is obvious that this was not a 
temporary order, but a final order. 
The only part of the order that could change was the duration, 
and the Decree stated that the only criterion to determine 
continuation or termination by motion would be the Appellant's 
1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
disability status. In other words, if Ms. Bilancia's disability 
continued, then so would the alimony, but if her disability were 
discontinued, then she would be eligible for work and alimony would 
terminate. 
While the trial court may have concluded that Mr. Bemis did 
not have the ability to pay alimony, this matter is completely 
irrelevant to the issues before the trial court. As previously 
stated, the only area of interest in the action was whether or not 
the appellant's disability continued or not. If it continued, as 
the trial court found it did, then the alimony must be continued. 
If the appellant's disability had not continued, then alimony would 
have had to terminate. The appellant does not dispute the findings 
of fact by the court, only the application of those findings to the 
decree and the law. The trial court based its decision to 
terminate the appellant's alimony on impermissible facts and 
therefore, the trial court's decision should be overturned and 
Appellant should have her alimony award reinstated. 
Issue No. 2 
Res Judicata Applies to a Modification 
of The Decree of Divorce 
As pointed out above, the alimony award was a final order. 
The only changeable portion of the order was the duration which 
would only change after at least one year and depending solely on 
the Appellant's disability status. 
2 
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It is painfully obvious that the Decree left only enough room 
to continue or terminate alimony based solely on the Appellant's 
continuing disability status. Any other changes, as correctly 
pointed out by the trial court, would have to be made pursuant to 
a petition to modify the Decree. Interestingly, there was no 
petition to modify and there was no argument or evidence introduced 
by the Appellee that reflected the intent of the parties in regard 
to the meaning of paragraph 15 of the Decree of Divorce. In light 
of this, the Maoris & Associates, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 16 P.2d 
1214 (Utah 2000) decision, cited by the Appellee as supporting his 
conclusion that this is not a final order, in fact supports the 
Appellant's point of view that this is a final order. In this 
case, the order is final. The only issue for the court was whether 
to continue or terminate alimony on certain grounds outlined in the 
stipulation and Decree. As there was no reservation of the issue 
of amount or any other factor, including ability to pay, the order 
is in fact res judicata as to all items except those specifically 
reserved as was the continuation or termination based solely on the 
continuing status of the Appellant's disability. Therefore, Res 
Judicata does apply to the order including the Appellee's ability 
to pay, and any deviation, except what was specifically authorized 
by the decree, had to be done by modification. As there was no 
modification filed, and there was specifically found to be no 
substantial or material change of circumstances, the trial court 
overstepped its bounds by terminating alimony based on the 
3 
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Appellee's ability to pay. 
Issue No. 3 
The Trial Court Did Violate Both U.C.A. 30-3-5 
And Rule 6-404 of The U.R.J.A. 
As previously pointed out, the court did in fact violate the 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5 and Rule 6-404 of 
the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. The Appellee completely 
misconstrues the Appellants arguments in regards to the necessity 
of filing a modification action to come to the result the court 
reached. Appellee states that the "decree applies equally to both 
parties, and the rules apply equally to both parties." This is in 
fact what the Appellant has argued form the beginning. Plainly 
put, the decree states that alimony would continue or terminate 
based on the Appellant's disability status. Therefore, if the 
disability continues, so does alimony, and if the disability ends, 
so does alimony. This is what was provided in the stipulation of 
the parties and in the final decree of divorce. For the court to 
go beyond the decree and look into different areas and make 
substantive changes to the decree without a petition to modify is 
error, and the same is a violation of both U.C.A. 30-3-5 and Rule 
6-404 of the U.R.J.A.. 
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Issue No. 4 
The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion And Wrongly Applied 
The Law to Terminate The Appellant's Alimony 
The final argument submitted by the Appellee, simply put, is 
not well founded. The Appellee's complete argument is simply that 
for failure to marshal the evidence as required by Moon v. Moon, 
973 P.2d 431 (Utah Ct. App.), the court should affirm the trial 
court's order. It is true that Moon requires a party who is 
attempting to challenge the findings of fact of the trial court to 
marshal the evidence in the manner presented by the Appellee's 
argument. However, the Appellee negates to mention that it is not 
the finding of fact itself that is relevant here. It is, in fact, 
the application of those facts made by the trial court to the 
Decree and the law which is most relevant. 
It would be error to affirm the trial court's decision "based 
on plaintiffs' failure to show the findings of fact to be 
unsupported." Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, (Utah 1991); See 
also; Dishinger v. Potter, 424 Utah Adv. Rep. 31, 2001 UT App. 209. 
In fact, the Supreme Court of Utah Stated that "[i]f the appellant 
fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes that the 
record supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a 
review of the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and 
the application of that law in the case. Saunders, 806 P.2d at 199; 
See also Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 
1989); Soharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
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In this case, there were irrelevant findings of fact which 
were incorrectly relied upon by the trial court in making its 
decision. The application of the relevant findings of fact made by 
the" trial court leaves only one possible decision, and that is to 
continue alimony. 
Conclusion 
In the instant case, the lower court, absent subject matter 
jurisdiction, has attempted to utilize equity to give rights back 
to the Appellee which he voluntarily contracted away in his 
stipulation and subsequent Decree of Divorce. In so doing, the 
lower court has emaciated the principles of res judicata, and 
circumvented even the parties' own stipulation. The court's 
decision is, thus, not only legally violative of the doctrine of 
res judicata, but obviates the provisions of U.C.A. 30-3-5 and Rule 
6-404 of the U.R.J.A.. Appellant, once again, requests that the 
Appellate Court reverse the decision with specific instructions to 
the lower court to reinstate alimony pursuant to the Stipulation 
and Decree previously entered. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ 0 day of February, 2002. 
HUGHES AND BURSELL, P.C. 
1ICHAEL D. HUGHES 
STEPHEN D. FOOTE 
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I, Stephen D. Foote, certify that on February ^O, 2002, I 
served two copies of the attached Appellant's Reply Brief upon 
Lamar Winward, the counsel for the appellee in this matter, by hand 
delivering the same to him at the following address: 
Lamar Winward 
150 North 200 East, # 204 
St. George, UT 84770 
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